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Economists have puzzled over why eligible individuals fail to enroll in social safety net programs.
“Chilling effects” arising from an icy policy climate are a popular explanation for low program take-up
rates among immigrants, but such effects are inherently hard to measure.  This paper investigates a
concrete determinant of chilling, Federal immigration enforcement, and finds robust evidence that
heightened enforcement reduces Medicaid participation among children of non-citizens.  This is the
case even when children are themselves citizens and face no eligibility barriers to Medicaid enrollment.
Immigrants from countries with more undocumented U.S. residents, those living in cities with a high
fraction of other immigrants, and those with healthy children are most sensitive to enforcement efforts.
Up to seventy-five percent of the relative decline in non-citizen Medicaid participation around the
time of welfare reform, which has been attributed to the chilling effects of the reform itself, is explained
by a contemporaneous spike in immigration enforcement activity. The results imply that safety net
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Given the widespread concern about moral hazard and crowd-out arising from social 
safety net programs, it is perhaps surprising that a high fraction  of  low-income 
individuals fail to participate in programs for which they are eligible.  A Kaiser Family 
Foundation report estimates that 52 percent of eligible adults without private insurance 
took up Medicaid in 2002, for example (Davidoff  et al., 2005).  Take-up rates are 
particularly low for immigrants;  just  30 percent of eligible non-citizen adults  were 
enrolled in Medicaid in 2002, compared with 57 percent of citizens. (Davidoff et al., 
2005).   
 
A growing literature investigates why some refrain from using social assistance to which 
they are entitled.  In the wake of the 1996 welfare reform and the associated decline in 
immigrant participation in public programs, some researchers posit that the general policy 
environment can affect program participation even for those who maintain eligibility.  
Such indirect effects are termed “chilling effects” because they arise from an icy policy 
climate rather than from direct eligibility changes.  The term more generally is used to 
describe a situation in which “speech or conduct is suppressed by fear of penalization at 




In the academic literature, “chilling” has been treated as a residual that explains otherwise 
puzzling responses to changes in safety net programs.  This paper investigates  a 
previously unexplored determinant of chilling  for immigrants, Federal immigration 
enforcement,  to assess the extent to which the overall policy environment  influences 
participation decisions in Medicaid.    
 
As described below, the results suggest an economically and statistically significant 
relationship between the level of enforcement and participation in Medicaid by children 
of non-citizens, even when the children themselves are citizens.  The results point to the 
importance of seemingly unrelated policy choices in determining program take-up. 
 
                                                 
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chilling_effect_(term).  Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan used the 
term to describe a situation  in which there was a policy deterring freedom of expression but no law 
explicitly prohibiting the expression.   3 
I. Background 
 
Economists interested in understanding take-up of public programs have emphasized the 
roles of stigma, information, and program design.
2  Though a full discussion of the take-
up literature is beyond the scope of this paper, Remler and Glied (2003) and Currie 
(2004) offer reviews.  Both conclude that the most consistent determinant of take-up is 




   
As noted above, the take-up issue is more severe for immigrants.  Immigrants may have 
particular difficulty obtaining information about programs,  completing  English 
application forms, and navigating the complex administrative system. Stigmatization of 
participation may be high for some immigrant groups (Bertrand et al., 2000).  A sizable 
literature suggests that immigrant groups have higher eligibility for and lower take-up 
rates of public programs, and that assimilation facilitates take-up (Currie, 2004).  
 
Until recently, the role of the broader policy climate in influencing program participation 
has received less attention.  After welfare reform, however, there was a decline in 
program participation beyond what would have been expected due to strict eligibility 
changes, especially for immigrants.
4  As a result, some  observers hypothesize  that 
“chilling effects” arising from the anti-immigrant language of the welfare reform bill may 
have discouraged immigrant participation in public programs for which they remained 
eligible.
5
                                                 
2 For example, Daponte, Sanders and Taylor (1999) find that providing information about Food Stamp 
eligibility to low-income households substantially increases participation rates, particularly for households 
with the most to gain from participation.  Other studies explore how culture propagated through social 
networks could influence participation, perhaps due to stigma or information (Bertrand et al., 2000, Borjas 
and Hilton, 1996, and Aizer and Currie, 2004.) 
 
3 Despite its popularity as an explanation, there has been little empirical work successfully isolating the 
effect of stigma on program take-up. 
4 A sizable literature explores the effect of welfare reform on health insurance more broadly.  See Bitler, 
Gelbach, and Hoynes (2005) and DeLeire, Levine, and Levy (2006) for examples.  More recent work 
focuses on the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act which increased citizenship documentation requirements 
(Sommers, 2010). 
5 The 1996 PRWORA welfare reform bill included a number of provisions that were targeted towards 
immigrants.   Immigrant eligibility for public means-tested programs was restricted for legal non-citizens.  
For Medicaid, the law banned the use of federal funds for most post-enactment immigrants (those arriving   4 
 
Though the existence of “chilling” due to an icy policy climate is plausible, fear and 
informal dissuasion are difficult to observe.  Analysts typically assume that otherwise 
unexplained declines in participation or take-up of non-citizens are due to chilling effects.  
Mazzolari (2004), for example, accounts for a wide range of economic and demographic 
factors and finds that non-citizen immigrants have an unexplained decline in take-up of 
several safety net programs of 3-4 percentage points following welfare reform.  She 
attributes this excess decline to chilling.   Similarly, Kandula et al. (2004) report that 
Medicaid participation fell for pre-enactment immigrants following welfare reform even 
though they maintained eligibility. 
 
Other literature exploits variation in state generosity towards immigrants following 
reform.
6
                                                                                                                                                 
after August 1996) for the first five years after arrival.  States had the option to use their own funds to 
provide Medicaid to this group and about half of them chose to do so.  The law also allowed states to ban 
legal pre-enactment non-citizen immigrants from participating in Medicaid, though almost all continued 
offering Medicaid to pre-enactment immigrants.  In addition, the reform made it harder for states to use 
their own funds to provide benefits to undocumented immigrants.  Welfare reform also restricted immigrant 
eligibility for food stamps, Supplemental Security Income, and cash welfare in ways that differed across 
states.    Exceptions to immigrant restrictions were made for recently arrived refugees, Cuban/Haitian 
entrants, and some other groups. 
  The  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) welfare reform bill removed Federal support for post-enactment immigrants 
(those arriving after August 1996) for the first five years of residence; states have the 
option to use their own funds to support this group.  Royer (2005) finds that non-citizen 
Medicaid take-up declined for those states that denied benefits to new immigrants 
following reform.  Borjas (2003) reports that non-citizen Medicaid participation fell more 
in less generous states.  Noting that most non-citizens in the sample had arrived before 
1996 and therefore maintained eligibility for Medicaid, Borjas surmises that declines in 
participation stemmed from the “chilling effects” of welfare reform.  In contrast, Kaushal 
and Kaestner (2005) do not find differences in new immigrant Medicaid participation in 
6 Hungerman (2005) uses the differential impact of welfare reform on non-citizens to study charitable 
giving.   5 
more and less generous states.
7
 
  However, they also interpret their results as evidence of 
“chilling effects,” in this case arising from the icy national policy environment. 
In sum, previous analyses have found that program participation decisions respond to 
policy changes in ways that extend beyond what would be expected based on the strict 
eligibility changes.  These unexplained changes in participation decisions are commonly 
attributed to chilling.  An Urban Institute report on the subject concludes:   
 
“Because comparatively few legal immigrants were ineligible for public 
benefits as of December 1997, it appears that the steeper declines in 
noncitizens' than citizens' use of welfare, food stamps, and Medicaid owe 
more to the "chilling effect" of welfare reform and other policy changes 
than they do to actual eligibility changes.”  (Fix and Passel, 1999) 
 
This paper takes a different approach by considering chilling induced by Federal 
enforcement of immigration laws.  Enforcement of immigration law sharply increased in 
the mid 1990s.  There are good reasons to believe that Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) actions  could affect program participation.  For example, following 
Proposition 187’s passage in 1994 in California, the Department of Health Services 
developed a program with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to request 
repayment of Medicaid benefits for non-citizen immigrants upon re-entry into the United 
States after a trip abroad.  Other anecdotes suggest that applicants for citizenship were 
occasionally asked to reimburse the government for previously used benefits, though this 
was not official policy.   
 
For undocumented immigrants seeking health insurance for their children, fear of 
government authority is a natural concern.  Loue, Cooper, and Lloyd (2005) interview 
157 women in San Diego in 1999-2001 and find that roughly a quarter of immigrants 
arriving after 1996 and a quarter of undocumented immigrants had heard that they could 
                                                 
7 Kaestner and Kaushal (2005) report no evidence of “chilling” in TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families, the program providing cash welfare following welfare reform) participation for new immigrants.   6 
not obtain medical care due to immigration status.   Similar proportions said they were 
somewhat or very afraid to obtain medical care for themselves or a family member.  
 
Program design and the general policy climate have the potential to exacerbate or 
ameliorate the fears of undocumented immigrants.  For instance, application forms for 
means-tested programs typically require or request Social Security numbers for every 
member of the household, even if only children are applying for benefits.
8  Of six welfare 
sites studied in a 2003 report for the Department of Health and Human Services, only one 
uses an application that explicitly states that applicant information will not be shared with 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).  On the other hand, applications at two 
sites explicitly state that information will be shared with the INS and that the INS 




INS policy could influence the program participation decisions even for legal permanent 
residents.  For example, the welfare reform bill reiterated a long-standing doctrine that 
immigrants deemed a “public charge” could be deported or denied future citizenship.  
Though “public charge” deportations have rarely been implemented  in the post-war 
period, the term was not defined in the legislation.  It was not until late 1997 that a 
clarification was made indicating that occasional use of safety net services would not be 
grounds for deportation or denial of citizenship.   Nevertheless, even after that date there 
were reports of immigrants being told that participation in public programs could 
jeopardize their immigration status (Schlosberg and Wiley, 1998).  Heightened 
enforcement could intensify fears about public charge deportations. 
 
To investigate the interactions between program participation and enforcement of 
immigration law, I exploit spatial and temporal variation in enforcement action between 
1993 and 2002.  The increase in immigration  enforcement  in the 1990s varied 
                                                 
8 Recently some states have been removing requests for household social security numbers on application 
forms in an effort to increase Medicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance Program participation among 
children of undocumented immigrants (Holcomb et al., 2003). 
9Holcomb et al., 2003.   7 
substantially across the 33 INS administrative  districts  and across country-of-origin 
groups.   
 
In the next section, I discuss the patterns of enforcement and factors driving variation 
across areas and over time.  The analysis described below aims to consider a novel 
determinant of “chilling.”  There has been little previous work examining the link 




II.  Enforcement and Enforcement Data 
 
Immigration enforcement data were obtained from the Department of Homeland Security 
via a 2009 Freedom of Information Act request.  The dataset covers fiscal years 1992 to 
2003 and consists of counts of Immigration and Naturalization Services “deportable 
aliens located” as the result of internal investigations, by INS internal district, country of 
origin, and fiscal year.
11
 
  “Deportable aliens located” is the INS term for apprehensions.  
Because some cells are suppressed due to confidentiality concerns, these data are 
supplemented with published reports in the INS Statistical Yearbooks listing deportable 
aliens located by INS district and fiscal year.   
Figure 1 shows trends in enforcement over time.  There is a sharp increase in 
enforcement in the mid-1990s, presumably due to the sharply increasing INS budget and 
manpower.
12
                                                 
10 One exception is unpublished work by Vargas (2010) who explores the effect of fear of deportation on 
WIC and SCHIP participation for immigrants in mixed status families.  Previous research has looked at the 
effect of enforcement on labor market outcomes.  Bansak (2005) finds a negative effect of employer 
sanctions on wages of likely illegal immigrants in the 1980s, for example.  Orrenius and Zavodny (2009) 
report adverse labor market consequences for Latin American immigrants post-2001 which they attribute to 
increased enforcement.   
  The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
increased enforcement expenditures and gave the INS expanded authority to locate and 
11 Border enforcement activities are excluded because they are less likely to affect resident immigrants and 
because the geographic distribution of the impact is unclear.   
12 Full-time equivalent staffing for internal immigration enforcement jumped from 1746 in fiscal year 1995 
to 2513 in fiscal year 1998.  The overall enforcement budget increased from 2.1 billion to 3.4 billion over 
the same time period, and the share of those funds spent on border control declined from 64 to 56 percent, 
leaving additional resources for internal enforcement and investigations.  (Source:  “Immigration 
Enforcement Spending Since IRCA,” Migration Policy Institute Fact Sheet, November 2005.)   8 
remove undocumented immigrants. The number of internal deportable aliens located 
went from 70,000 in 1995 to 123,000 in 1997, for example.    These trends mirror 
Medicaid participation rates for children non-citizens.  
 
I aggregate the 33 INS districts into 25 “clusters” of states which map into Current 
Population Survey geography for use in the analysis described below.
13   The level of 
enforcement in a fiscal year is summarized by the number of deportable aliens located 
divided by the estimated number of non-citizens in 1995.
14
 
  The log average enforcement 
over a two year period including the year prior to and year of the Medicaid decision is the 
indicator of enforcement activity; results using levels of enforcement rather than logs are 
reported in the appendix.  Figure 2 reports the level of enforcement activity by fiscal year 
for 7 of the 25 INS clusters in the data.  Some areas, such as Texas, experienced sharp 
increases in enforcement activity while others, such as California, saw more modest 
changes.   
To distinguish the impact of enforcement from potential confounding factors, it is helpful 
to understand what drives variation in enforcement within a district over time.  There are 
several potentially important factors.  First, new illegal immigration is likely to affect 
both the perceived need for enforcement as well as the number of apprehensions 
conditional on the level of effort.  Second,  though enforcement is implemented by 
Federal authorities, local attitudes toward immigration could influence the actions of the 
district manager.  Third, the budget and staff available to district offices have a direct 
impact on the level of enforcement activity.   Finally, district managers have a large 
amount of discretion as to the level and type of enforcement they pursue. 
 
New immigration could be a potential confounding factor if it affects enforcement and 
has a direct effect on Medicaid participation decisions.
15
                                                 
13 Clusters are usually a single state or a group of states.  The one exception is that the New York 
metropolitan area within New York state is an independent INS district and its own cluster.  INS districts 
typically follow county lines and are often states or groups of states.   
  The government produces 
14 I estimate the number of non-citizens using IPUMS Census data for 1990 and 2000.  The average of 
these two numbers is the estimated population for 1995. 
15 New immigrants are generally less likely to participate in safety net programs.    9 
estimates of inflows of undocumented immigrants for large states based on the Current 
Population Survey, but these tend to be quite noisy and are not available nationwide.  
More reliable estimates are produced using decennial Census data but these lack annual 
detail.  Legal immigration is reliably reported at the state-year level, however. 
 
I use a number of approaches to address the potential bias stemming from the correlation 
between new immigration and enforcement.  First, regressions account for the main effect 
of enforcement on citizens, so any effect of new immigration that burdens non-citizens 
and citizens equally is controlled.  Second, I remove non-citizen children arriving within 
five years of the survey date from the sample.  In some specifications, I further limit the 
sample to mothers who arrived more than five years ago or mothers who arrived prior to 
1992.  These results indicate  that  enforcement affects the long-standing non-citizen 
population.  In addition, I allow new legal immigration to a state to differentially affect 
non-citizen  Medicaid participation decisions, but I find no evidence that it does so.  
Furthermore, I document below that enforcement is not correlated with observable 
characteristics of non-citizen families in the sample. 
 
A second potential cause of enforcement variation is local attitudes.  District managers 
work for the Federal government and have no obligation to tailor enforcement to local 




  However, local efforts could facilitate Federal apprehensions if 
undocumented immigrants are  apprehended for other crimes and then transferred to 
Federal authorities.   
In the analysis below, I consider three imperfect proxies for local attitudes –  media 
coverage of enforcement activity, survey data on attitudes toward immigration, and 
immigration issue “report card” scores for Congressional representatives.  None of these 
proxies offer much predictive power and controlling for them does not alter the results.  
Nevertheless, it is possible that local attitudes are important but not captured by the 
                                                 
16 See Seghetti et al. (2004).  Starting in 2003, the Federal government has trained selected local law 
enforcement agencies to play a more active role in enforcing immigration law.   10 
available variables; if so, the “chilling” that appears to be induced by enforcement may 
stem in part from general anti-immigrant sentiment at the local level. 
 
Resources available for enforcement activity have an important impact on the number of 
apprehensions.  Although changes in aggregate enforcement spending stemmed from the 
Illegal  Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996  and related 
Congressional policy changes, less clear is how resources were allocated across districts.  
Reports typically describe the INS as a dysfunctional agency without the cultural will or 
the information infrastructure to make optimal resource allocation decisions.
17
 
  Davila, 
Pagan, and Grau (1999) suggest that the agency seeks to maximize total apprehensions 
rather than minimize the number of undocumented immigrants. 
Furthermore, the bureaucracy of the INS is generally perceived to leave a large amount of 
discretion to district managers.  Many observers lament the lack of centralized decision 
making and  the  absence of communication between districts.  Martin (2000), for 
example, notes: 
 
“Consistency of approach among district offices has been a longstanding 
issue for INS….[T]he position of INS district director has traditionally 
carried considerable power and wide enforcement discretion. District 
directors proudly place their own distinctive personal stamp on the actions 
of the district office, and sometimes this custom has led to broad 
disparities in actual practices, with regard to both enforcement and 
services (adjudications). Even within district offices,  particular units 
sometimes follow their own priorities. (p.2)” 
 
Similarly,  a GAO report concluded that the “INS leadership had allowed INS’ 
organizational structure to become decentralized without adequate controls.  Specifically, 
its regional structure had created geographical separation among INS programs and 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Center for Equal Opportunity (1995), Siskin et al. (2006), and Government 
Accountability Office (1999).   11 
hampered resource allocation and consistent program implementation.”
18
 
  Idiosyncratic 
preferences of district managers combined with aggregate budget fluctuations are likely 
important determinants in the degree of immigration enforcement within districts over 
time.   
In sum, variation in immigration enforcement may stem from several sources.  Because 
the determinants of enforcement cannot be easily characterized, the empirical strategy 
controls for a wide range of potential factors that could be correlated with enforcement.  
The key identifying assumption is that, after controlling for these factors, variation in 
enforcement stems from sources that are uncorrelated with differential Medicaid 
participation for children of non-citizens. 
 
III. Medicaid Data and Other Data 
 
Information on Medicaid participation comes from the March Annual Demographic 
Supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS), a survey implemented by the U.S. 
Census Bureau which aims to be nationally representative of households in the United 
States.
19  The CPS asks whether each individual in the household was covered by 
Medicaid in the previous calendar year and is among the most commonly used data sets 
in studies of Medicaid participation.  In the years following the introduction of the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), children participating in the SCHIP 
program are coded as participating in Medicaid.
20
 
  Citizenship  status  and country of 
origin of each household member is available starting in the 1994 survey.  The survey 
contains a number of other demographic and economic indicators as well. 
I pool the March surveys for the years 1994-2003 to generate the sample, which covers 
the reference years 1993-2002.    My sample is limited to children under 18 years of age 
who can be matched to a mother within the household.  I also exclude children directly 
                                                 
18 General Accounting Office (1999), page 3, summarizing a January 1991 GAO/GGD report.  
19 Undocumented immigrants are likely to be undercounted in the Current Population Survey; legal status 
of non-citizens is not reported. 
20 States vary as to whether SCHIP programs are administratively distinct from the Medicaid program.   12 
targeted  by the provisions of the 1996 PWRORA bill:  non-citizen children  whose 
mothers arrived less than five years prior to the survey.  Another advantage to excluding 
this group is that it mitigates bias coming from new immigrant inflows:  such inflows are 
likely to be associated with increased enforcement.  The primary analysis is based on a 
low-SES sample, which is limited to  children  below 200 percent of the poverty line 
whose mothers lack a college degree. 
 
I assign children’s status based on their mother’s country of origin and citizenship status, 
under the assumption that mothers are likely to make decisions about Medicaid 
enrollment for the family.
21
 
  The immigration status of non-citizens (i.e. whether they are 
documented or undocumented immigrants) is not observable in the CPS.  In the 
appendix, I show that children whose mothers are from counties with a high number of 
undocumented migrants are more sensitive to enforcement.  However, I cannot rule out 
the possibility that legal non-citizens are being “chilled” by enforcement efforts.    
Under-reporting of program participation is an important limitation of these data.  Meyer, 
Mok, and Sullivan (2009) find substantial under-reporting of public benefit receipt 
compared to administrative records in five  major surveys, including the Current 
Population Survey. The Meyer et al. study does not examine Medicaid participation, but 
finds reporting rates of only 50-70 percent for AFDC/TANF (cash welfare) in the CPS. 
Medicaid misreporting may be a particular problem because state Medicaid programs 
have multiple names and Medicaid may lack the salience of cash welfare for participants.  
However, Klerman, Ringel, and Roth (2005) find a Medicaid reporting rate of 70 percent 
for adults and 75 percent for children in the CPS using California data, with much lower 
rates for welfare reporting in the same sample.  Of particular concern is the potential that 
under-reporting behavior is responsive to enforcement; I explore the implications of 
endogenous under-reporting below. 
 
                                                 
21 Alternative methods of assigning child’s status are also explored in the appendix; the citizenship status of 
the mother’s spouse (typically the child’s father) appears to be at least as important as that of the child’s 
mother.  Children who are themselves non-citizens appear to be more responsive to enforcement than other 
children of non-citizens, as shown in Appendix Table 2.   13 




  This imputation includes measurement error.  For example, 
individuals with high levels of medical expenses may qualify for Medicaid but appear 
ineligible, whereas individuals with high levels of assets may be disqualified but appear 
eligible.  I use two alternative measures of eligibility.  Because recipients  of 
AFDC/TANF (cash welfare) are typically enrolled in Medicaid, the first  eligibility 
measure incorporates imputed AFDC/TANF eligibility.  A child is imputed to be eligible 
for Medicaid if her family appears to qualify for AFDC/TANF or if her family appears to 
qualify for Medicaid via “expansion eligibility.” “Expansion eligibility” includes children 
with family income low enough to qualify for Medicaid regardless of AFDC/TANF 
status.   
Because AFDC/TANF eligibility is difficult to measure, a second definition of Medicaid 
eligibility relies on expansion eligibility only.
23
 
  Over 88 percent of children deemed 
eligible through the first definition are imputed to be eligible using the Medicaid 
expansion eligibility rules only.  Both measures of eligibility are imperfect, and analyses 
that examine take-up (rather than overall participation) should be interpreted with some 
caution.     
Table 1 shows the key summary statistics for the children in the low-SES sample and the 
full sample.  Medicaid participation is highest for children of non-citizens. Such children 
have less educated mothers but are less likely to live in single parent families. Children of 
non-citizens are also more likely to be income-eligible for Medicaid, to lack health 
insurance, and to have inferior health status.  
 
The analysis also requires information on state welfare policy.  I rely on detailed 
information provided by Zimmerman and Tumlin (1999) on state welfare policies related 
to immigrants following welfare reform.  I use three definitions of generosity.  First, I 
                                                 
22 Many thanks to Lara Shore-Sheppard for sharing the imputation algorithm and eligibility rules. 
23 To impute eligibility for TANF after 1996, I use AFDC rules in place in 1996.  For subsequent years, 
states were required to offer Medicaid to those children who would have been eligible under AFDC rules.  
States also have work requirements and other policies that shape eligibility for TANF; these are not fully 
captured by my imputation algorithm.       14 
follow Borjas (2003) and consider a state “generous” if it offered food assistance or SSI 
to pre-enactment immigrants or offered any of four major programs (TANF, Medicaid, 
food assistance, or SSI) to post-enactment immigrants.
24  This definition includes the six 
largest immigrant states; 89 percent of children of non-citizens in my sample live in a 
generous state according to the Borjas definition.
25
 
  Kaushal and Kaestner (2005) offer a 
simpler definition, describing a state as “generous” if it offered TANF or Medicaid to 
post-enactment immigrants.  Under this definition 56-57 percent of children of non-
citizens live in generous states.  Among the six largest immigrant states, only California 
and Illinois are considered generous.  As a third alternative, I describe states as generous 
if Zimmerman and Tumlin (1999) categorize immigrant safety net programs in the state 
as most available or somewhat available.  All of the major immigrant states except Texas 
are included as generous; 72 percent of children of non-citizens live in generous states 
according to the  Zimmerman and Tumlin definition.  For all three measures of 
generosity, the state is labeled as generous or not generous after welfare reform and the 
generosity variable equals zero for all states prior to welfare reform. 
I measure perception of enforcement using newspaper coverage of immigration 
enforcement events; a typical event is a raid on an employment or housing site.  The 
sample of newspaper articles comes from a balanced panel of newspapers available in 
Lexis-Nexis (English) and Proquest Ethnic NewsWatch (English and Spanish); articles 
are included if they cover a  non-criminal internal immigration enforcement  event 
involving five or more migrants.
26
                                                 
24 Post-enactment immigrants are those arriving after welfare reform in August 1996.  TANF refers to 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, the cash welfare which replaced Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program after welfare reform.  SSI refers to Supplemental Security Income, which 
provides cash to low-income disabled individuals. 
  I construct three measures of coverage: the number of 
articles in national news media relating to an event within the cluster, the circulation-
weighted number of local articles relating to an event within the cluster, and the 
circulation-weighted number of articles in local newspapers  regarding any event. All 
25 The six states with the highest numbers of immigrants are California, Florida, Illinois, New York, New 
Jersey, and Texas.  
26  The Spanish-language article sample from ProQuest Ethnic Newswatch is too small to generate 
meaningful separate analysis.   15 
three measures are adjusted for the cluster population size. Due to incomplete coverage in 
the databases, these variables are noisy proxies for actual media attention to enforcement. 
 
I also use the American National Election Study (ANES) to calculate state-level measures 
of attitudes towards immigration.
27
 
  The ANES asks each respondent whether he or she 
would like to see immigration increased, unchanged, or decreased in the years 1992, 
1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2004.  The answers to this question are collapsed and 
aggregated to the state level to generate the fraction of state residents who would like to 
see immigration decreased.  Interpolation is used for non-response years.  For states 
without responses, the average of the Census region is used.  Unfortunately, small sample 
sizes in the ANES mean that this variable does not offer much predictive power. 
Finally, I use Congressional representation in each state as a proxy for local attitudes 
towards immigration.  Immigration report cards for each member of Congress are 
obtained from an advocacy group which aims to curb immigration, NumbersUSA.
28  
Report card scores range from 0 to 100 and are based on the members’ votes on 
immigration related legislation from 1989-2010; high scores indicate that the 
representative typically votes to reduce immigration.  State scores are averages of 
Congressional members’ career scores for representatives in office during the two years 
prior to the CPS survey year.
29
 
   
IV.  Methodology and Results 
 
A.  Enforcement and Non-Citizen Medicaid Participation 
 
The analysis examines the effect of immigration enforcement on Medicaid participation 
by children of non-citizens.  For an overview of the data, I start by considering a sample 
of children of non-citizens only.  The preliminary linear probability model is:  
                                                 
27 The National Election Studies (www.electionstudies.org). THE 2004 NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY 
[dataset]. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor]. 
28See  http://www.numbersusa.com/content/my/tools/grades. 
29 I use the NOMINATE data set (http://www.voteview.com/dwnomin.htm) and Wikipedia to identify 
members of Congress in office at the end of each Congressional session.      16 
01 * ict ct c t ict Medicaid enforce year ββ θ δµ = + + ++  
where  enforce refers to INS enforcement activity in cluster c relevant for participation 
year t,  c θ interacted with year controls for a cluster-specific linear time trend, and time 
fixed effects  t λ  control for shocks that affect all non-citizens nationally.  Standard errors 
are clustered by INS cluster to account for common shocks in a given local area. 
 
Table 2 shows the results for the low-SES sample and the overall sample of children of 
non-citizens.  One log-point increase in enforcement activity in one’s local area reduces 
Medicaid participation by 8.7 percentage points for low-SES children and 4.9 percentage 
points for all children.  It is also evident from Table 2 that there is no comparable effect 
on children of non-citizens, suggesting that the results for the non-citizen sample are not 
generated by factors discouraging Medicaid participation more generally.  Furthermore, 
there are no comparable effects if one considers the lead in enforcement, where the lead 
is defined as the average of the survey year (the year following the reference year) and 
the subsequent year.    These results suggest that enforcement reduces Medicaid 
participation for children of non-citizens. 
 
B.  Full Analysis of Participation 
 
To improve statistical power and to more fully account for local shocks, the bulk of the 
analysis combines non-citizens and citizens and looks for a differential  response  to 
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where  enforce  refers to INS enforcement activity in cluster c relevant for participation 
year t,   i noncit  indicates that the mother of child i is a non-citizen.  Controls account for 
cluster-state-group-citizen  fixed effects  * csg i noncit Ω   to capture permanent  state 




year dummies   interacted with  i noncit  to account for annual changes in non-citizen 
                                                 
30 The New York City metropolitan area and the remainder of New York are treated as separate “cluster-
states” because they are located within separate INS clusters.   17 
participation nationally.  Demographic controls Xi include child age*year fixed effects, 
mother’s education, mother’s marital status, indicators for whether the family lies below 
100 or 200 percent of the poverty line, an indicator for whether the mother has been in 
the U.S. at least five years, an indicator for whether the mother arrived in the U.S. during 
the 1980s, and an indicator for whether the mother arrived prior to 1980.  Standard errors 
are clustered on INS cluster to account for common shocks.  In this specification, the key 
coefficient  1 β  represents the effect of enforcement on children of non-citizens over and 
above the effect of enforcement on other children.   
 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the main results for the low-SES sample with different sets of 
controls.  The preferred baseline specification (second column) shows that one log point 
increase in enforcement efforts differentially reduces Medicaid participation by children 
of non-citizens by 9.2  percentage points.  One can also restrict to citizen children, 
children whose mother’s arrived more than five years ago, or both.
31
 
  Results are largely 
comparable for these groups.  That is, even for children born in the U.S. to long-standing 
non-citizen  residents,  enforcement influences the Medicaid participation decision.  
Similar effects are estimated if the comparison group is restricted to children of foreign-
born citizens. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows analogous results for the full sample.  Point estimates are 
roughly half the size for this group because few high-SES children participate in the 
Medicaid program.  Nevertheless, even in the full sample there is a  statistically 
significant reduction in Medicaid participation for children of non-citizens of at least 4.7 
percentage points. 
 
In Appendix Table 1, I explore whether enforcement is predictive of other observable 
factors that might influence participation.  These include family poverty status, mother’s 
marital status, mother’s education, mother’s labor supply, child’s age, and mother’s time 
since arrival.  There is no statistically significant relationship between enforcement and 
                                                 
31 Recall that non-citizen children whose mothers arrived less than five years ago are potentially directly 
affected by welfare reform and are therefore excluded from all analyses.  The results are not substantively 
changed if this group is included.   18 
any of these factors.  This fact suggests that Medicaid participation is influenced by 
enforcement rather than by contemporaneous economic or demographic changes across 
areas that disproportionately affect non-citizens. 
 
C.  Eligibility and Take-Up 
 
Table 4 explores the implications of enforcement for Medicaid eligibility.  The baseline 
results  (i.e., those reported in column II of Table 3) could be biased  if enforcement 
changes coincided with state eligibility expansions that disproportionately benefited non-
citizens, or if economic conditions changed such that fewer non-citizens were eligible.  I 
impute eligibility in two ways, as described in the Section III.  The first incorporates the 
AFDC/TANF pathway and eligibility arising due to Medicaid expansions and the second 
ignores the AFDC/TANF eligibility pathway.  Columns II and III of Table 4 show that 
immigration enforcement is not predictive of Medicaid eligibility for the low-SES sample 
or the overall sample.   
 
Table  4 also  examines the effect of immigration on take-up of Medicaid –  that is, 
participation conditional on eligibility.  Comparing column I to columns IV and V for the 
low-SES sample, it is clear that the effects of enforcement on take-up are of similar 
magnitude to the effects on participation.  This is not surprising given that at least two-
thirds of the low-SES sample is Medicaid eligible.  For the high-SES sample, the effect 
on take-up is larger than the effect of participation.  In sum, it appears that enforcement is 
not correlated with income eligibility and that enforcement discourages take-up 
conditional on eligibility for children of non-citizens. 
 
D.  Is Chilling National or Local? 
 
In Table 5, I explore alternative dimensions of enforcement for the foreign born low-SES 
sample.  Column I repeats the preferred analysis for the foreign-born sample using 
enforcement at the INS cluster level.  Column II instead considers enforcement targeted 
at one’s country-of-origin group at the national level, and finds that it is not predictive of   19 
Medicaid participation.
32  Similarly, group-specific enforcement in one’s cluster has a 
smaller  effect than overall enforcement in one’s local area  and has a statistically 
insignificant effect on participation.
33
 
  It appears that aggregate local enforcement is the 
most important determinant of participation, though some caution is warranted due to 
measurement error in the local group-specific variable.   When all three measures of 
enforcement are included simultaneously, the standard errors are large and one cannot 
say anything definitive.  
Measures of enforcement are unavailable at geography smaller than the INS district.  
However,  it is possible  that  metropolitan areas with many non-citizens experience  a 
disproportionate share of district enforcement  per non-citizen.   Furthermore, even if 
enforcement is proportional to the number of non-citizens across cities within a district, 
residents of areas with many non-citizens might be more connected to immigrant social 
networks and thus more aware of enforcement policy.   
 
To explore effects in high- and low-exposure areas, I find the fraction non-citizen of the 
total population for each of the 201 metropolitan areas in the sample.  The median level 
of fraction non-citizen is computed for each country-of-origin group in the sample, and 
for each group the sample is split into those above and below the median.
34
 
   As is 
evident in column V of Table 5, there is an insignificant effect  of  cluster-level 
enforcement for non-citizens residing in areas with few other non-citizens.  Columns VI 
through VIII also  suggest no statistically detectible pattern relating enforcement and 
Medicaid participation for those living in “low exposure” areas. 
                                                 
32 Because the regressions control for non-citizen*year effects, this is the effect of enforcement targeted 
towards one’s group over and above aggregate national changes in enforcement. 
33 The relatively weak results for group-cluster enforcement may stem from measurement error.  Local 
group-specific enforcement is suppressed for small cells in the enforcement data.   
34 I calculate exposure to non-citizens by averaging the fraction non-citizen in the metropolitan area in the 
1990 Census and fraction non-citizen in the 2000 Census.  The median is constructed separately for each 
country of origin group because groups that cluster in non-citizen areas may also respond differently to 
enforcement for other reasons.  I combine those at and above the median into a single group; the results are 
not sensitive to this choice.  Results are also quite similar if exposure to non-citizens is replaced with 
exposure to same-group members.   20 
In areas with many non-citizens, on the other hand, the effect of aggregate enforcement at 
the  cluster level is quite  pronounced (see column  IX of Table 5).    There is also a 
marginally significant effect of local group-specific enforcement in column XI.  In the 
horse race in column XII, aggregate cluster-level enforcement appears to be more 
important that group-specific local enforcement, but this may be due to measurement 
error in the latter variable.  
 
The more substantial impact of enforcement in non-citizen enclaves may arise because 
enforcement  per non-citizen  is disproportionately located in these areas, because 
immigrants have more access to information about enforcement actions, because 
immigrant social networks are more likely to include  someone affected, or some 
combination of these factors.  Baseline participation rates are also higher in high-
exposure areas. 
 
E.  Who Responds to Enforcement? 
 
In Appendix Table 2, I use a triple interaction approach to explore the responsiveness of 
different sub-groups to enforcement policy.
35
 
  For example, the first two columns 
indicate that children under 2 and children under 7 are slightly more affected by 
enforcement than older children, though the differences are extremely small.  Similarly, 
married mothers are slightly more likely to respond to enforcement. 
According to INS, the share of undocumented residents differs substantially across 
country-of-origin groups.
36
                                                 
35 All two-way interactions are accounted for in these regressions.   
  One might suspect that groups with many undocumented 
migrants are likely to respond more dramatically to enforcement efforts.  Mexicans have 
the highest proportion undocumented of any group in the U.S.; roughly 52 percent of the 
Mexican-born population living in the U.S. is estimated to be undocumented.  Children of 
Mexican mothers do appear to respond more than other children to enforcement efforts, 
as shown in the fourth column of Appendix Table 2.   
36 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population 
Residing in the United States: 1990 to 2000,” Office of Policy and Planning, Report 1211.    21 
 




  The effect of enforcement is marginally significant for groups in which 
most immigrants are documented, but is nearly triple in size for groups with a high 
fraction of undocumented migrants, as shown in column V.  Column VI of Appendix 
Table 2 indicates that non-citizen children are more responsive to enforcement than other 
children of non-citizens.   
The final columns of Appendix Table 2 investigate whether responsiveness to 
enforcement varies by child health status.  Medicaid participation is most responsive for 





F.  Insurance Status, Health, and Program Participation  
 
Table 6 presents information on how enforcement affects insurance status.  The effect of 
enforcement on public health insurance is almost identical to the effect of Medicaid.  This 
suggests that immigrants deterred from Medicaid due to enforcement are not enrolling in 
alternative public health insurance programs.
39
 
  Private health insurance increases 
slightly but not statistically significantly in response to enforcement for the low-SES 
sample.  The point estimates from Panel A imply that a 10 percentage point increase in 
Medicaid participation (due to absence of enforcement) crowds out 1.4 percentage points 
of private insurance for the low-SES sample.  However, the crowd-out “ratio” (the 
change in private insurance divided by the change in Medicaid) would have standard 
errors too large to generate a precise crowd-out estimate. 
Table  6  also suggests that the reduction in a child having any health insurance (5.8 
percentage points due to a log-point increase in enforcement) is only 63 percent of the 
                                                 
37 High-undocumented groups include those with mothers born in Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Dominica, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Kenya. 
38 As discussed below, health status may respond directly to enforcement. 
39 Alternative public programs could include idiosyncratic state programs, Indian Health Service programs, 
military insurance programs, etc.   22 
reduction in Medicaid, implying 3.7 percentage points of “crowd-out” associated with a 
10 percentage point change in Medicaid.  The discrepancy between the change in private 
insurance and the change in any insurance stems from the fact that about 8 percent of 
low-SES children participate both in Medicaid and private insurance over the course of a 
year.
40  Thus, the point estimates suggest that of every 100 children discouraged from 
Medicaid participation due to enforcement, 14 enroll in private insurance that they would 
not have otherwise had, and another 23 rely exclusively on private insurance that they 
would have had for part or all of the year.
41
 
  These are not precisely estimated numbers, 
however, and the confidence intervals are also consistent with no crowd-out.  Panel B 
presents results for the full sample; here the point estimates suggest little or no crowd-
out. 
Reductions in Medicaid participation could lead to inferior child health.  Aizer (2003) 
shows that exogenous increases in Medicaid participation reduce hospitalizations for 
conditions that benefit from preventative care.  Enforcement could also directly impact 
reported health status by affecting the level of stress in the household or the willingness 
of parents to seek health care conditional on insurance status.  The Current Population 
Survey asked the respondent to rate the child’s health status on a five-point scale from 
Excellent to Poor; such data are readily available starting in survey year 1996.
42
 
  The 
limited health data in the CPS allow for the examination of the reduced form relationship 
between enforcement and reported health, but do not allow one to distinguish among 
mechanisms. 
The impact of enforcement on reported health status is shown in Table 6.  Column V of 
Table 6  replicates the Medicaid analysis for the years 1996 and onward; the point 
estimates are slightly larger than the baseline.  The final columns of Table 6 demonstrate 
                                                 
40 About 21 percent of low-SES children with private health insurance during some point of the year also 
have public health insurance during some point in the year.  About 17 percent of low-SES children with 
public health insurance also have private insurance.  The CPS does not offer information about whether 
these sources of insurance are concurrent or sequential. 
41 The different implied crowd-rates highlights the importance of considering within-year insurance 
transitions.  See Buchmueller and Shore-Sheppard (2010). 
42 Similar self-reported health scales are widely used and shown to predict mortality across race/ethnicity 
groups (McGee et al., 1999).  It is nevertheless possible that enforcement could affect reporting biases.   23 
the higher levels of enforcement are associated with inferior reported health outcomes 
both in the low-SES and the full samples.  Further analysis (not shown) reveals that 
higher enforcement is primarily associated with children moving from the “very good” 
health category to the “good” health category.   
 
Table 7 presents the estimated effect of enforcement on other poverty programs.  The 
impact on any receipt of  public assistance  (AFDC/TANF),  Disability Income, and 
Supplemental Security Income  are small and statistically insignificant.  On the other 
hand, there is suggestive evidence that Food Stamp participation has a similar response to 
enforcement as Medicaid, though standard errors are large. 
 
One explanation for the greater sensitivity of non-cash benefits to enforcement is that 
undocumented immigrants may be reluctant to apply for cash benefits even in the 
absence of enforcement.  Health benefits typically have the most streamlined application 
process (often possible to complete by mail or internet) and are least likely to require an 
in-person interview or fingerprinting.  Food stamp applications are often integrated with 
the cash assistance application and tend to be complicated, but some states  have 
integrated a Food Stamp screen into the Medicaid/SCHIP determination process and 




An in-depth analysis of the effect of enforcement across programs is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but the differences suggest that enforcement can interact with program design 
to influence participation.  
G.  State Policy Climate and Local Attitudes 
 
The chilling literature has emphasized state policy generosity towards immigrants.  It is 
important to account for state policy changes around the time of welfare reform in the 
analysis of the effect of enforcement on Medicaid participation. Researchers have used 
various  criteria to categorize as a state as generous.   As described in Section III, I 
consider three alternative definitions of state generosity.  For all three measures of 
                                                 
43 It is also possible that higher marriage rates among immigrants may influence responsiveness.   24 
generosity, the state is labeled as generous or not generous after welfare reform and the 
generosity variable equals zero for all states prior to welfare reform. 
 
Table 8 shows the effect of state policy climate.
44
 
  Both the Borjas and the Kaushal and 
Kaestner  definitions  of generosity  show a negative (wrong-signed)  and  insignificant 
effect of state generosity  on non-citizen participation.  Inclusion of these variables 
slightly  increases  the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on enforcement.  The 
Zimmerman and Tumlin definition of generosity is positively (though insignificantly) 
associated with Medicaid participation.  The coefficient on enforcement is reduced to -
0.065 when the Zimmerman and Tumlin measure of generosity is included, but statistical 
significance is unaffected.   
As described in section III, I also incorporate several measures of local immigration 
attitudes – media coverage, local attitudes, and congressional representation.  The three 
media variables interacted with non-citizen status are included in the fourth column of 
Table 8.  Individual coefficients are not shown; only one (the number of national news 
stories about local events) is statistically significant with the sign as expected and another 
is wrong-signed and significant.  The inclusion of the media coverage variables slightly 
reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on enforcement but does not affect statistical 
significance.  As shown in the final two columns of Table 8, anti-immigrant sentiment of 
the population and anti-immigration Congressional representation have no detectible 
effect on Medicaid participation and do not affect the coefficient on enforcement.  These 
variables, like the media coverage variables, are imperfect proxies for local attitudes, so 
one cannot rule out the possibility that local attitudes matter to Medicaid participation 





                                                 
44 State Medicaid policies vary on a range of other dimensions that could differentially affect non-citizens.  
A full exploration is beyond the scope of this paper.    25 
H.  Robustness 
 
Appendix Table 3 presents the results of sensitivity analysis.  The preferred specification 
is replicated in the first column.  The second column shows the results using a linear 
rather than logged measure of enforcement.  The results suggest that a one percentage 
point increase in enforcement (e.g. increasing from one arrest per 100 non-citizens to two 
arrests per 100 non-citizens) reduces Medicaid participation by 4.9 percentage points.  
This effect is of the same order of magnitude as that implied by the log specification 
evaluated at the sample mean. 
 
The baseline measure of enforcement divides deportable aliens located by the estimated 
number of non-citizens in the cluster in 1995.  In the third column of Appendix Table 3, 
the denominator instead  incorporates a time-varying measure of the number of non-
citizens based on linear interpolation between Census years.  This alternative method of 
defining enforcement has little impact on the results. 
 
The fourth column of Appendix 3 restricts the sample to mothers arriving in the U.S. 
prior to 1992.  The robustness of the results to this sample restriction mitigates concerns 
about the correlation of enforcement activity with unobservable characteristics of new 
migrants.    
 
The fifth  column incorporates state-citizen-specific linear time trends.  This variable 
reduces the size of the enforcement coefficient by about a quarter and raises the standard 
error, rendering the coefficient insignificant.  The result indicates that some of the 
identifying variation is caused by differential time trends for non-citizens and citizens 
across states, which could be caused by enforcement or other factors.  Similarly, allowing 
the effect of the state unemployment rate to vary by citizenship status somewhat weakens 
the enforcement coefficient.  In both the fifth and sixth columns, the enforcement results 
are weakened only when the new variables and a full set of demographic controls are 
included, suggesting that the analysis may be limited by statistical power issues (the 
analyses without controls are not shown).    26 
 
The final column of Appendix Table 3 controls for the effect of new legal immigration.  
The results are not substantively changed.  I also try dropping each of the eight largest 
immigrant states one at a time (results not shown).  The results are robust to exclusion of 
individual states. 
 
The  baseline  analysis uses the mother’s citizenship status to predict Medicaid 
participation.  Appendix Table 4 explores alternative definitions of citizenship.  Results 
are similar if the mother’s spouse is a non-citizen, if either parent is a non-citizen, or if 
both parents are non-citizens.  The final two columns of Appendix Table 4 show that 
having a non-citizen spouse makes a citizen mother much more responsive to 
enforcement but has a relatively minor effect on a non-citizen mother.  In sum, families 
are responsive to enforcement when either or both parents are a non-citizen. 
 
I.  Endogenous Citizenship and Endogenous Under-Reporting 
 
One potential threat to identification is that individuals have some ability to decide 
whether to become citizens, and they may pursue citizenship if the policy climate is less 
favorable towards non-citizens.   Rates of citizenship increased substantially over the 
sample period.
45  Van Hook (2003) argues that the changing composition of citizenship 
may explain up to half of the decline in non-citizen welfare participation following 
welfare reform. To investigate the possibility of endogenous citizenship, I first examine 
whether the probability that a child’s mother is a citizen appears to respond to 
enforcement.  I do not find evidence that this is the case, perhaps because it usually takes 
five years of legal residence plus a year or more of processing time to become a citizen.
46
 
   
                                                 
45 Van Hook (2003) notes that the number of naturalizations was 240,000 in 1992 and peaked in 1996 at 
over one million.   
46 Results not shown.  In a regression with mother non-citizen on the left hand side and including state-
group fixed effects and education controls,  the coefficient on enforcement is 0.012 with a standard error of 
0.009; in other words, enforcement has an insignificant and wrong-signed coefficient.  High application 
fees and English language requirements may further deter would-be citizens.  Immigrants married to 
citizens and those serving in the military have shorter residency requirements.   27 
To further investigate this question, I instrument for mother’s citizenship using her 
country of origin.  In this framework one can control for state-group fixed effects but not 
state-group-citizen fixed effects.  The OLS analysis using the revised specification yields 
a smaller but statistically significant differential effect of enforcement on children of non-
citizens.  The instrumented coefficients shown in Appendix Table 5 are larger than the 
OLS estimates and similar to the baseline effects reported in Table 3, suggesting that 
endogenous citizenship is not driving the results.  This test does not rule out the 
possibility of selective return migration or survey non-response by those fearing 
enforcement, but does suggest that the relationship between enforcement and Medicaid 
participation does not arise because of selective maternal entry into citizenship.   
 
It is also important to consider the effect of bias arising from under-reporting of 
Medicaid.  Of particular concern is the possibility that enforcement reduces the reporting 
rate differentially for children of non-citizens.  To assess the degree to which endogenous 
under-reporting could be driving the results, I simulate data assuming that the reporting 
rate for children of non-citizens varies linearly up to 100% with the percentile of the 
enforcement distribution.   Children who report “no Medicaid” are randomly assigned to 
“Medicaid” accordingly.  In the simulation, reporting rates for children of citizens are 
assumed to be 100% and unresponsive to enforcement.   
 
The results of this exercise are presented in Appendix Table 6.  Reporting rates of 80 to 
90 percent under the highest enforcement only slightly attenuate the results, and the 
coefficient on enforcement remains marginally significant even if reporting rates range 
from  70 percent under the highest enforcement  to 100 percent under the lowest 
enforcement.  Thus, moderate degrees of enforcement-induced under-reporting are 





                                                 
47 If enforcement does not affect participation but drives severe under-reporting for non-citizens, the 
baseline results are misleading.  It is also possible that enforcement affects the overall survey response rate 
for non-citizens.  If undocumented immigrants are less likely to participate in the survey under high 
enforcement, the baseline results are likely to be biased towards zero.   28 
J.  Magnitude of the Effects 
 
To gauge the magnitude of the effects, I use the estimated model to predict what would 
have happened to Medicaid participation among children of non-citizens if enforcement 
levels had maintained their initial levels – specifically, the average of 1993 and 1994 
levels.  The results suggest that participation would have fallen from 46.5 percent in 
survey year 1995 to 45.5 percent in survey year 2000, a drop of 1 percentage point, had 
enforcement stayed constant at the 1993-1994 levels.  The rise in immigration 
enforcement can therefore explain three-quarters of the actual 4.4 percentage point 
decline during this time.  Using the 1995 to 1999 time frame, the simulation indicates 
enforcement can explain almost half of the actual 8.3 percentage point decline.   A large 
fraction of the decline in immigrant Medicaid participation around 1996, which has 







The results presented here cast new light on the chilling of immigrant Medicaid 
participation  around the time of welfare reform.  Previous literature  documents  an 
unexplained decline in immigrant program participation and hypothesizes that low take-
up stems from fear and confusion stemming from changes in welfare policy.  The current 
paper  suggests a new potential culprit -  Federal immigration enforcement –  which 
contributes  to immigrant reluctance to participate in Medicaid.   Immigration 
enforcement “chills” would-be Medicaid applicants even when they remain eligible.  The 
results imply that much of the decline in immigrant Medicaid participation around the 
time of welfare reform can in fact be attributed to increased enforcement of immigration 
law.   
 
                                                 
48 Aggregate enforcement explains only a small fraction of the rebound in non-citizen participation rates in 
the latter years of the sample.  Other factors such as the adoption of the SCHIP program, which most states 
adopted in 1998, may help explain rising participation rates after the 1999 survey year.  Buchmueller et al. 
(2008) document that SCHIP take-up among children of immigrants was at least as high as take-up for 
children of natives, thereby causing convergence in public health insurance rates.   29 
The findings  highlight the fact that seemingly unrelated policies can have important 
consequences for program take-up.    Economists interested in take-up have  mainly 
focused on program design and interactions across safety net programs.  However, 
interactions across broad  policy areas may be important determinants of program 
participation. 
 
     30 
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Figure 1.   Medicaid Participation for Children of Non-Citizens and 
Immigration Enforcement, 1994-2003
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AZ, NVTable 1.  Means of Key Variables
Low-SES Sample Full Sample
Mom Non-Citizen
Mom Foreign Born 
Citizen Mom Native Born Mom Non-Citizen
Mom Foreign Born 
Citizen Mom Native Born
(N=26,942) (N=6,978) (N=112,286) (N=42,012) (N=19,371) (N=331,558)
Medicaid 0.45 0.39 0.47 0.32 0.17 0.20
Medicaid Eligible (Definition 1) 0.80 0.75 0.73 0.54 0.31 0.29
Medicaid Eligibile (Definition 2) 0.69 0.67 0.64 0.47 0.28 0.26
Any Health Insurance 0.68 0.74 0.84 0.74 0.85 0.90
Any Food Stamps 0.27 0.23 0.35 0.17 0.09 0.13
Any Public Assistance/Welfare 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.11 0.05 0.08
Any SSI 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.03
Any DI 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Child is Citizen 0.81 0.96 1.00 0.82 0.97 1.00
Mom is High School Grad Exactly 0.22 0.33 0.45 0.22 0.27 0.34
Mom is Some College Exactly 0.09 0.22 0.29 0.13 0.24 0.31
Mom is College Grad or More 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.27 0.23
Family Under 200% FPL 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.65 0.37 0.36
Child Age 7.47 9.08 7.91 7.51 9.23 8.45
Mom Worked Last Year 0.42 0.57 0.62 0.52 0.73 0.75
Mom Married 0.76 0.70 0.49 0.82 0.84 0.75
Mom Spouse Citizen (if married) 0.22 0.70 0.96 0.31 0.81 0.98
Lives in Generous State (Borjas Definition) 0.89 0.88 0.68 0.89 0.89 0.71
Lives in Generous State (KK Definition) 0.57 0.49 0.41 0.56 0.53 0.45
Lives in Generous State (ZT Definition) 0.72 0.70 0.44 0.72 0.75 0.48
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in State 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.53
National Coverage of Local Events Index 2.24 2.35 2.18 2.27 2.34 2.22
Local Coverage Index 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Local Coverage of Local Events Index 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Enforcement Level in Cluster*1000 7.79 7.80 8.44 7.53 6.92 8.39
Enforcement Level for Group*1000 1.99 0.88 n/a 1.61 0.49 n/a
Enforcement Level in Cluster-Group*1000 2.15 1.11 n/a 1.73 0.60 n/a
Child in Excellent/Very Good Health 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.73 0.77 0.83
Child in Good Health 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.15
Child in Poor Health 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:  All samples exclude non-citizen children whose mothers arrived within the past five years.  The Low-SES sample includes children of mothers lacking a college degree and under 200 
percent of the poverty line.  Medicaid eligibility definition 1 imputes the AFDC/TANF eligibility pathway; Medicaid eligibility definition 2 does not.  Measures of state generosity and anti-
immigrant sentiment described in text.  Enforcement level is the average number of deportable aliens located in the reference year and previous year per non-citizen in the cluster, group, or 
cluster-group.Table 2.  Preliminary Analysis
Dep.Var:  Medicaid Participation I II III IV
Sample Mother Non-Citizen Mother Non-Citizen Mother Citizen Mother Citizen
Cluster f.e. yes yes yes yes
Year f.e. yes yes yes yes
Cluster-specific time trends yes yes yes yes
Panel A.  Low-SES Sample (mean=0.45) (mean=0.44) (mean=0.47) (mean=0.47)
Log(Enforcement) -0.087+ 0.019
(0.043) (0.022)
Log(Lead of Enforcement) 0.005 -0.002
(0.032) (0.023)
Number of Observations 26,942 23,528 119,264 102,790
R-squared 0.042 0.041 0.016 0.016
Panel B.  Full Sample (mean=0.32) (mean=0.32) (mean=0.20) (mean=0.20)
Log(Enforcement) -0.049+ 0.014
(0.027) (0.014)
Log(Lead of Enforcement) 0.013 0.002
(0.018) (0.013)
Number of Observations 42,012 36,103 350,929 296,775
R-squared 0.033 0.033 0.010 0.010
Notes:  Linear probability model.  Standard errors in parantheses are clustered by INS cluster.  **, *, and + represent statistical significance at  the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  All samples exclude non-citizen children whose mothers arrived within five years.  The 
Low-SES sample is restricted to children living below 200 percent of the poverty line and whose mothers have less than a college degree.   Enforcement is measured as the average of the number of deportable aliens located per non-citizen in the reference year 
and the year prior to the reference year in the INS cluster.  The lead of enforcement is measured as the average of the number of deportable aliens located per non-citizen in the two years following the reference year in the INS cluster.Table 3.  Effect of Immigration Enforcement on Medicaid Participation
Dep.Var:  Medicaid Participation I II III IV V VI
Sample All All Kid Citizen
Mom Arrived > 5 
Years
Kid Citizen and Mom 
Arrived> 5 years Mom Foreign Born
Mom Non-Cit*State f.e. yes
Mom Non-Cit*Year f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log(Enforcement) yes yes yes yes yes yes
State*Group*Mom Non-Cit f.e.  yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Panel A.  Low-SES Sample (mean=0.47) (mean=0.47) (mean=0.47) (mean=0.47) (mean=0.47) (mean=0.44)
Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) -0.106** -0.092* -0.099* -0.095* -0.103* -0.113*
(0.031) (0.035) (0.041) (0.035) (0.040) (0.048)
Number of Observations 146,206 146,206 140,587 143,599 137,980 33,920
R-squared 0.025 0.226 0.227 0.225 0.227 0.258
Panel B.  Full Sample (mean=0.21) (mean=0.21) (mean=0.21) (mean=0.21) (mean=0.21) (mean=0.27)
Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) -0.049* -0.047* -0.049+ -0.048* -0.052* -0.079*
(0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.028)
Number of Observations 392,941 392,939 384,288 388,856 380,205 61,383
R-squared 0.023 0.359 0.364 0.358 0.364 0.327
Notes:  Linear probability model.  Standard errors in parantheses are clustered by INS cluster.  **, *, and + represent statistical significance at  the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  All samples exclude non-citizen children whose mothers arrived within five years.  The 
Low-SES sample is restricted to children living below 200 percent of the poverty line and whose mothers have less than a college degree.  New York City and the remainder of New York are treated as distinct states because they lie in different INS clusters.  
Enforcement is measured as the average of the number of deportable aliens located per non-citizen in the reference year and the year prior to the reference year in the INS cluster.  Demographic controls include dummies for mother's educational attainment, 
age*year fixed effects, indicators for being below 100 percent and 200 percent of the poverty line, an indicator for the mother arriving in the U.S. within the previous five years, an indicator  for the mother arriving in the U.S. after birth and prior to 1980, an 
indicator for the mother arriving in the U.S. during the 1980s, and an indicator for the mother being currently married.Table 4.  Effect of Immigration Enforcement on Medicaid Eligibility and Take-Up
I II III IV V
Dependent Variable Medicaid Participation Eligibility Def 1 Eligibility Def 2
Medicaid (if Eligibile          
by Def 1)
Medicaid (if Eligibile          
by Def 2)
Mom Non-Cit*Year f.e. yes yes yes yes yes
Log(Enforcement) yes yes yes yes yes
State*Group*Mom Non-Cit f.e.  yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Panel A.  Low-SES Sample (mean=0.47) (mean=0.74) (mean=0.65) (mean=0.56) (mean=0.55)
Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) -0.092* 0.017 0.032 -0.115* -0.112*
(0.035) (0.025) (0.029) (0.047) (0.042)
Number of Observations 146,206 146,206 146,206 109,433 96,444
R-squared 0.226 0.453 0.555 0.181 0.183
Panel B.  Full Sample (mean=0.21) (mean=0.32) (mean=0.28) (mean=0.51) (mean=0.51)
Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) -0.047* 0.019 0.024 -0.099* -0.093*
(0.022) (0.025) (0.024) (0.046) (0.042)
Number of Observations 392,939 392,939 392,939 126,839 112,367
R-squared 0.359 0.667 0.603 0.207 0.211
Notes:  Linear probability model.  Standard errors in parantheses are clustered by INS cluster.  **, *, and + represent statistical significance at  the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  All samples exclude non-citizen children 
whose mothers arrived within five years.  The Low-SES sample is restricted to children living below 200 percent of the poverty line and whose mothers have less than a college degree.  New York City and the remainder of 
New York are treated as distinct states because they lie in different INS clusters.  Enforcement is measured as the average of the number of deportable aliens located per non-citizen in the reference year and the year 
prior to the reference year in the INS cluster.  Demographic controls as described in Table 3.  Eligibility Definition 1 imputes eligibility incorporating the AFDC/TANF eligibility pathway and Medicaid expansions.  Eligibility 
Definition 2 ignores the AFDC/TANF eligibility pathway.Table 5.  Measurement of Enforcement, Foreign-Born Low-SES Sample
Dep.Var.:   Medicaid Participation I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII
Sample All All All All Low  Low  Low  Low  High High High High
Exposure Exposure Exposure Exposure Exposure Exposure Exposure Exposure
(mean=0.44) (mean=0.41) (mean=0.50)
Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement of All Non-Citizens in Cluster) -0.113* -0.123 0.013 -0.021 -0.412** -0.417**
(0.048) (0.074) (0.060) (0.121) (0.069) (0.096)
Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement of Group Nationally) 0.057 0.076 -0.029 -0.066 0.027 0.043
(0.091) (0.076) (0.161) (0.170) (0.122) (0.078)
Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement of Group Within Cluster) -0.047 -0.003 0.005 0.050 -0.152+ -0.017
(0.036) (0.048) (0.049) (0.096) (0.075) (0.046)
Number of Observations 33,920 33,920 33,809 33,809 12,089 12,089 12,054 12,054 16,475 16,475 16,457 16,457
R-squared 0.192 0.192 0.190 0.190 0.263 0.262 0.259 0.261 0.172 0.171 0.170 0.172
Notes:  Linear probability model.  Standard errors in parantheses are clustered by INS cluster.  **, *, and + represent statistical significance at  the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  All samples exclude non-citizen 
children whose mothers arrived within five years.  The Low-SES sample is restricted to children living below 200 percent of the poverty line and whose mothers have less than a college degree.  All regressions 
include full set of fixed effects and demographic controls as in the previous tables.  Enforcement is measured as the average of the number of deportable aliens located per non-citizen in the reference year and 
the year prior to the reference year in the INS cluster.   High exposure indicates that the child resides in an area with greater than or equal to the fraction of non-citizens of a typical child from her (mother's) 
country of origin group.   Table 6.  Effect of Immigration Enforcement on Health Insurance Status and Health





Insurance Any Health Insurance
Medicaid (Survey 
Year>=1996)
Excellent or Very 
Good Health (Survey 
Year>=1996)
Good Health (Survey 
Year >=1996)
Poor Health (Survey 
Year>=1996)
Mom Non-Cit*Year f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log(Enforcement) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
State*Group*Mom Non-Cit f.e.  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Panel A.  Low-SES Sample (mean=0.47) (mean=0.49) (mean=0.39) (mean=0.81) (mean=0.46) (mean=0.72) (mean=0.24) (mean=0.01)
Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) -0.092* -0.092* 0.013 -0.058* -0.134** -0.078+ 0.070* 0.010**
(0.035) (0.033) (0.023) (0.022) (0.033) (0.038) (0.032) (0.004)
Number of Observations 146,206 146,206 146,206 146,206 114,904 114,904 114,904 114,904
R-squared 0.226 0.203 0.210 0.085 0.213 0.054 0.047 0.020
Panel B.  Full Sample (mean=0.21) (mean=0.24) (mean=0.70) (mean=0.89) (mean=0.21) (mean=0.81) (mean=0.16) (mean=0.00)
Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) -0.047* -0.048* -0.016 -0.044* -0.073** -0.051* 0.045* 0.007**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.002)
Number of Observations 392,939 392,939 392,939 392,939 316,467 316,467 316,467 316,467
R-squared 0.359 0.313 0.393 0.095 0.346 0.054 0.047 0.014
Notes:  Linear probability model.  Standard errors in parantheses are clustered by INS cluster.  **, *, and + represent statistical significance at  the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  All samples exclude non-citizen children whose mothers arrived within five years.  
The Low-SES sample is restricted to children living below 200 percent of the poverty line and whose mothers have less than a college degree.  New York City and the remainder of New York are treated as distinct states because they lie in different INS 
clusters.  Enforcement is measured as the average of the number of deportable aliens located per non-citizen in the reference year and the year prior to the reference year in the INS cluster.  Demographic controls as in Table 3.  Columns V through VIII based 
on years 1996 onwards.Table 7.  Effect of Immigration Enforcement on Program Participation





Income Disability Insurance Food Stamps
Mom Non-Cit*Year f.e. yes yes yes yes
Log(Enforcement) yes yes yes yes
State*Group*Mom Non-Cit f.e.  yes yes yes yes
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes
Panel A.  Low-SES Sample (mean=0.21) (mean=0.06) (mean=0.01) (mean=0.33)
Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) -0.015 0.001 -0.006 -0.078+
(0.020) (0.009) (0.006) (0.041)
Number of Observations 146,206 146,206 146,206 146,206
R-squared 0.258 0.060 0.028 0.258
Panel B.  Full Sample (mean=0.08) (mean=0.03) (mean=0.01) (mean=0.13)
Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) 0.007 0.002 0.001 -0.051+
(0.011) (0.005) (0.004) (0.027)
Number of Observations 392,939 392,939 392,939 392,939
R-squared 0.287 0.064 0.019 0.383
Notes:  Linear probability model.  Standard errors in parantheses are clustered by INS cluster.  **, *, and + represent statistical significance at  the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  All samples exclude non-citizen children whose 
mothers arrived within five years.  The Low-SES sample is restricted to children living below 200 percent of the poverty line and whose mothers have less than a college degree.  New York City and the remainder of New York 
are treated as distinct states because they lie in different INS clusters.  Enforcement is measured as the average of the number of deportable aliens located per non-citizen in the reference year and the year prior to the 
reference year in the INS cluster.  Demographic controls as in Table 3.Table 8. Local Determinants of Participation, Low-SES sample
Dep.Var:  Medicaid Participation I II III IV V VI VII
(mean=0.47)
Measure of Local Climate Baseline
Generous*Post-
Reform:  Borjas 
definition
Generous*Post-

















Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) -0.092* -0.113** -0.114** -0.065* -0.081* -0.096* -0.093**
(0.035) (0.026) (0.038) (0.030) (0.032) (0.036) (0.030)
Mom Non-Cit*Local Climate -0.096 -0.045 0.041 not shown 0.010 0.222
(0.056) (0.038) (0.039) (0.167) (0.207)
Number of Observations 146,206 146,206 146,206 146,206 146,206 146,206 146,206
R-squared 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
Notes:  Linear probability model.  Standard errors in parantheses are clustered by INS cluster.  **, *, and + represent statistical significance at  the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  All samples exclude non-
citizen children whose mothers arrived within five years.  The Low-SES sample is restricted to children living below 200 percent of the poverty line and whose mothers have less than a college degree.  
All regressions include full set of fixed effects and demographic controls as in the previous tables.  Enforcement is measured as the average of the number of deportable aliens located per non-citizen 
in the reference year and the year prior to the reference year in the INS cluster.  Definitions of state policy generosity, media coverage, anti-immigrant sentiment, and anti-immigrant congressional 
representation are described in the text.Appendix Table 1.  Does Enforcement Predict Other Characteristics?




























Panel A.  Low-SES Sample
Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) n/a -0.004 0.031 -0.006 n/a -0.007 0.012 0.005 -0.174 -0.003
(0.029) (0.022) (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) (0.238) (0.009)
Number of Observations 146,206 146,206 80,038 146,206 146,206 146,206 146,206 146,206
R-squared 0.045 0.093 0.634 0.081 0.078 0.081 0.028 0.200
Panel B.  Full Sample
Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) 0.004 -0.014 -0.025 0.019 -0.015 0.005 0.016 0.015 -0.101 0.004
(0.023) (0.024) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.176) (0.009)
Number of Observations 392,941 392,941 392,941 297,360 392,939 392,939 392,939 392,939 392,941 392,941
R-squared 0.095 0.066 0.037 0.563 0.068 0.046 0.037 0.063 0.021 0.192
Notes:  Linear probability model.  Standard errors in parantheses are clustered by INS cluster.  **, *, and + represent statistical significance at  the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  All samples exclude non-citizen children whose mothers arrived within 
five years.  The Low-SES sample is restricted to children living below 200 percent of the poverty line and whose mothers have less than a college degree.  Regressions include citizen*year fixed effects and state*group*citizen fixed effects but not 
demographic controls.  Enforcement is measured as the average of the number of deportable aliens located per non-citizen in the reference year and the year prior to the reference year in the INS cluster.  Appendix Table 2.  Differential Responses to Enforcement,  Low-SES Sample
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Dependent Variable:  Medicaid
Characteristic Child Under 2 Child Under 7 Mother Married Mother Mexican
Mother From High 
Undocumented 
Group Child Non-Citizen
Child in Very 
Good/Excellent 
Health
Child in Poor 
Health
Mother Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement)*Characteristic -0.007* -0.006* -0.009** -0.055+ -0.114* -0.058** -0.017** 0.019
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.027) (0.044) (0.013) (0.003) (0.013)
Mother Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) -0.091* -0.090* -0.093* -0.079* -0.058+ -0.080* -0.123** -0.135**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.029) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Number of Observations 146,206 146,206 146,206 146,206 142,739 146,206 114,904 114,904
R-squared 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.219 0.227 0.219 0.215
Notes:  Linear probability model.  Standard errors in parantheses are clustered by INS cluster.  **, *, and + represent statistical significance at  the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  All samples exclude non-citizen children whose mothers arrived within five years.  The Low-SES sample is restricted to children living below 200 
percent of the poverty line and whose mothers have less than a college degree.  All regressions include full set of fixed effects and demographic controls as in the previous tables and the two-way interaction Log(Emforcement)*Characteristic.  (One exception is that the coefficient on Kidcit*enforcement  is reported rather 
than the triple interaction.)  Enforcement is measured as the average of the number of deportable aliens located per non-citizen in the reference year and the year prior to the reference year in the INS cluster.   Mothers from "High Undocumented Group" are those from countries estimated to have at least 25 percent 
residing illegaly in the U.S.  The countries include Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Dominica, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuala, and Kenya.  Rates of documentation are unavailable for a small number of country-of-origin groups.  Health status analyses use survey years 1996 and later.Appendix Table 3.  Robustness Checks, Low-SES Sample
I II III IV V VI VII
Dependent Variable:  Medicaid




















Add Control for 
State New Legal 
Immigration Rate 
*Non-Cit
Sample All All All
Mothers Arriving 
Before 1992 All All All
Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) -0.092* -0.089* -0.089* -0.067 -0.072+ -0.089*
(0.035) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041) (0.042) (0.035)
Mom Non-Cit*Enforcement -4.945+
(2.700)
Number of Observations 146,206 146,206 146,206 138,897 146,206 146,206 146,206
R-squared 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.228 0.227 0.226 0.226
Notes:  Linear probability model.  Standard errors in parantheses are clustered by INS cluster.  **, *, and + represent statistical significance at  the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  All samples exclude non-
citizen children whose mothers arrived within five years.  The Low-SES sample is restricted to children living below 200 percent of the poverty line and whose mothers have less than a college degree.  All 
regressions include full set of fixed effects and demographic controls as in the previous table.  Enforcement is measured as the average of the number of deportable aliens located per non-citizen in the 
reference year and the year prior to the reference year in the INS cluster.  Appendix Table 4.  Alternative Definitions of Citizenship, Low-SES Sample





























Definition of Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) -0.099* -0.123** -0.120** -0.085+ -0.112** -0.105** -0.113** -0.055 -0.156**
(0.036) (0.032) (0.037) (0.044) (0.038) (0.031) (0.027) (0.034) (0.051)
Number of Observations 146,206 80,038 80,038 80,038 80,038 146,206 146,206 19,857 60,181
R-squared 0.101 0.109 0.106 0.108 0.108 0.102 0.102 0.201 0.092
Notes:  Linear probability model.  Standard errors in parantheses are clustered by INS cluster.  **, *, and + represent statistical significance at  the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  All 
samples exclude non-citizen children whose mothers arrived within five years.  The Low-SES sample is restricted to children living below 200 percent of the poverty line and whose 
mothers have less than a college degree.  All regressions include full set of fixed effects and demographic controls as in the previous tables, except that citizenship categories for fixed 
effects are defined as indicated.  Enforcement is measured as the average of the number of deportable aliens located per non-citizen in the reference year and the year prior to the 
reference year in the INS cluster.  Appendix Table 5.  Instrumenting for Citizenship (Low-SES Sample)
Dep.Var:  Medicaid Participation OLS IV
Mom Non-Cit*Year f.e. yes Instrumented
Log(Enforcement) yes yes
State*Group f.e.  yes yes
Mom Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) -0.045** -0.101**
(0.009) (0.037)
Number of Observations 146206 146206
R-squared 0.071
Notes:  OLS model differs from baseline model in that state-group fixed effects are included rather than state-group-citizen fixed effects.  IV model instruments for citizen*year 
fixed effects and citizen*enforcement using group*year and group*enforcement. Standard errors in parantheses are clustered by INS cluster.  **, *, and + represent statistical 
significance at  the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  Sample excludes non-citizen children whose mothers arrived within five years and is restricted to children living below 200 percent 
of the poverty line and whose mothers have less than a college degree.  All regressions include full set of fixed effects but exclude demographic controls.  Enforcement is 
measured as the average of the number of deportable aliens located per non-citizen in the reference year and the year prior to the reference year in the INS cluster.  Appendix Table 6.  Simulated Under-Reporting, Low-SES Sample
I II III IV V
Dependent Variable:  Medicaid
Simulated Non-Citizen Reporting Rate Under Highest Enforcement 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Definition of Non-Cit*Log(Enforcement) -0.035 -0.050 -0.063+ -0.079* -0.087*
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.035)
Number of Observations 146,206 146,206 146,206 146,206 146,206
R-squared 0.219 0.220 0.221 0.223 0.224
Notes: Baseline specification using simulated data.  **, *, and + represent statistical significance at  the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  Reporting rates are assumed to vary linearly up to 100% based on the percentile of the enforcement 
distribution.  Reporting rates for children of citizens are assumed to  be 100% and unresponsive to enforcement.  See text for more details.   